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MODEL RULE 2.2 AND DIVORCE MEDIATION: ETHICS
GUIDELINE OR ETHICS GAP?
Mediation' has recently attracted both lay and professional attention
as an alternative form of dispute resolution.' Rule 2.2 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which allows lawyers to act as "in-
termediaries,"' expressly recognizes mediation as a form of intermedia-
tion.4 The application of Rule 2.2 to lawyers engaged in divorce
mediation remains unclear because the rule requires a lawyer engaged as
an intermediary to serve as a "common" representative, a role which
may be incompatible with the divorce mediation process.5 In addition,
Rule 2.2 conflicts with several state bar association rulings regarding di-
vorce mediation6 issued under the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.7 At present, fourteen states have adopted the Model Rules.8 As
1. Mediation is "the process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neu-
tral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider
alternatives, and research a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs." J. FOLBERG
& A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LIT-
IGATION 7 (1984).
2. Congress recently passed the Dispute Resolution Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-190, 94 Stat.
17 (codified at 28 App. U.S.C. § 1-3.4(b) (1982)). Although Congress did not fund the national
resource center for alternative dispute resolution provided in the legislation, the "passage of the Act,
even if unfunded, has the salutary effect of legitimizing what some consider to be a 'new' move-
ment." ABA Special Comm. on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, State Legislation on Dis-
pute Resolution, (Monograph Series No. 1) i (1982). Several professional associations have recently
formed, including the National Institute of Dispute Resolution, The Federal Mediation and Concili-
ation Service, The Academy of Family Mediators, and The Society of Professionals in Dispute Reso-
lution. Professional journals and newsletters have proliferated, including the Newsletter of the
Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Harvard Journal of Negotiation, NIDR's Dispute Reso-
lution Forum, Mediation Quarterly, and The Missouri Journal of Dispute Resolution.
Law schools have begun offering courses on mediation. See Riskin, Mediation in the Law Schools,
34 J. LEG. ED. 259 (1984). Law firms have set up in-house alternative dispute resolution sections.
See Silas, Settling Disputes, 72 A.B.A. J., April 1, 1986, at 37. Former Chief Justice Burger supports
diverting some cases from the adversarial system into alternative resolution forums. Burger, Isn't
There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
See text of Rule 2.2 infra note 24.
4. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 comment.
5. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
7. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1979). The American Bar
Association adopted the Model Rules to supersede the Model Code which was in force in various
forms in all states. See Falsgraf, Quo Vadis Model Rules?, 72 A.B.A. J., April 1, 1986, at 8.
8. As of March 1, 1987, the following states had adopted the Model Rules: Arizona, Arkan-
sas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
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other states consider their adoption, state bar associations must deter-
mine the proper application of Rule 2.2 to divorce mediation.9
This Note examines Rule 2.2 in the context of divorce mediation. Part
I defines mediation and highlights the differences between mediation and
traditional divorce proceedings. Part II examines the lawyer's represen-
tational role in mediation and the role mandated by Model Rule 2.2.
Part III explains the positions adopted by various bar association com-
mittees concerning divorce mediation. Part IV describes commentators'
concerns about the inadequacies of the common-representation approach
to mediation. Finally, part V offers solutions to the "ethics gap" created
by Model Rule 2.2 and advocates the adoption of a new model rule to
encompass divorce mediation.
I. MEDIATION, ADVERSARIAL DIVORCE AND THE COURTS
Mediation is a voluntary process in which a neutral third party, with-
out authority to impose a solution, helps the participants reach an agree-
ment. 10 Divorce mediation differs significantly from traditional divorce
proceedings.1 In a traditional legal dispute, the parties assume an adver-
sarial posture; if one wins, the other loses. The parties assume that a
general rule of law will determine the resolution of the dispute and seek
full legal entitlement rather than a settlement that accommodates the
needs of both. Parties who choose divorce mediation, in contrast, are
also concerned with non-material values such as honor, respect, dignity,
security and love.12 They recognize that divorce does not end, but only
changes their relationship, especially if they are parents who must make
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Washington. 1 Law. Man. on Prof. Cond. 01:3
(ABA/BNA) (Sept. 9, 1986).
9. The problems this Note discusses do not apply to non-lawyers engaged as mediators be-
cause only lawyer-mediators must follow the Model Rules. Likewise, this Note does not address
court-adjunct mediation because an entirely different set of ethical standards govern mediators work-
ing within a court-sponsored structure.
10. See supra note 1 for the definition of mediation. The mediation process can be used in a
variety of ways to resolve personal, social and economic problems. Examples include divorce, cus-
tody, neighborhood differences, educational conflicts, minority and racial tensions, environmental
concerns, business and labor disputes, and health care issues. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note
1, at xii.
11. See generally Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-45 (1982) (discussing
the differences between adversarial proceedings and mediation).
12. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 10. In mediation, "the emphasis is not on who is
right or wrong or who wins and who loses, but rather upon establishing a workable solution that
meets the participant's unique needs." Id.
[Vol. 65:223
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arrangements for their children's emotional and financial support. Be-
cause mediation allows the parties the flexibility to control the process, as
well as the outcome, the parties can emphasize important non-material
values and benefit from a creative solution to which each agrees.13
Courts view divorce mediation agreements as privately negotiated con-
tracts that are not subject to stringent substantive and procedural rules. 14
The parties may choose to embody their legal rights within the contract
or bargain away some rights for non-material benefits.5 Although mari-
tal settlements require court approval, courts are reluctant to scrutinize
or alter these contracts because of the consensual nature of the agreement
and the highly personal interests at stake. 6 Courts will set aside a medi-
ated private contract only if it is found "unconscionable."' 7  Conse-
quently, judicial review provides relief only in the most oppressive
situations. The wide range of contract possibilities and judicial deference
to the solution chosen make competent and ethical practice by lawyer-
mediators especially important.
II. MODEL RULE 2.2 AND THE LAWYER'S
REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE
Basic tenets of ethical legal practice dictate the lawyer's representa-
tional role and duties to his client. Because divorce mediation potentially
involves the representation of at least two clients, confusion arises as to
the lawyer-mediator's role. 8 Three models of representation exist. A
lawyer may serve in a traditional adversarial capacity, representing only
13. See Riskin, supra note 11, at 43-45. See also ABA, Special Comm. on Dispute Resolution,
Dispute Resolution Paper (Series No. 3), 47-48 (1984) (noting that the "legislatively regulated pace"
of litigation does not coincide with the "emotional pace" of divorce).
14. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 10.
15. Id. at 10. Mediation participants spend emotional energy reaching their agreement and,
therefore, are more invested in a mediation agreement than an agreement that others negotiate or
impose. Id. The majority of participants find satisfaction with the process and results of mediation.
Id. See also Pearson & Thonnes, The Benefits Outweigh the Costs, 4 FAM. ADV., winter 1982, at 26,
30-31 (providing detailed information on the participant's satisfaction with mediation).
16. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 10.
17. Id.
18. See ABA Special Comm. on Dispute Resolution, ADR: Mediation and the Law: Will Rea-
son Prevail?, (Discussion Series No. 3) 36 (1983). The report notes that "[m]ost lawyers see repre-
sentational advice as the heart of their practice, at least in dispute matters. And thus mediation
appears to be in violation of several canons of ethics; there seems to be either a lack of loyalty to the
client or a conflict of interest. This conceptual difference [between representational lawyering and
mediational lawyering] creates tremendous confusion and misunderstanding among those who as-
sume that it's a lawyer's job to represent somebody, and if you're not, you're not acting like a
1987]
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one party in the mediation process. 19 In this situation the other parties
must secure an advocate to protect their rights. Alternatively, the law-
yer-mediator may represent neither party acting instead as a neutral
facilitator in a non-adversarial capacity.20 Finally, the lawyer-mediator
may "commonly represent" all of the parties to the dispute.21 The or-
ganized bar has long discouraged, and sometimes prohibited, multiple
representation of clients.22 When a lawyer represents more than one cli-
ent in the same matter the possibility exists that the clients have, or will
develop, diverse interests. In such a situation, the lawyer faces difficult
conflict-of-interest problems: to which client does the lawyer owe the
duties of loyalty, zealous advocacy and confidentiality? 23
A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 2.2
The American Bar Association drafted Model Rule 2.2 to provide gui-
dance to lawyers engaged as intermediaries. Model Rule 2.2 adopts a
"common representation" approach to all forms of intermediation. The
Rule permits a lawyer to "act as intermediary between clients" if the
lawyer complies with the Rule's requirements. 24 The lawyer must con-
lawyer." Id. See also MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 comment (noting that "confusion can
arise as to the lawyer's role where each party is not separately represented").
19. See N. Carolina Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. 323 (1982) (allowing a lawyer to represent one party
to mediation in subsequent litigation if the lawyer clearly explains that she represents only one of the
parties at the time of mediation).
20. See infra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
21. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 2.2. See infra note 24 for text.
22. See e.g., Iowa Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. 83-3 (1983) (prohibiting a lawyer from acting as a
mediator in a divorce proceeding because of the actual or potential conflicts of interest); New Hamp-
shire Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. 1983-4/4 (1983) (prohibiting a lawyer from giving legal advice to both
parties in divorce mediation to prevent conflicts of interest); Kansas Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. 83-3
(1983) (prohibiting a lawyer from acting as a mediator if the parties are "adverse").
23. See generally M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975)
(discussing the duties of the lawyer in an adversarial system).
24. Model Rule 2.2 provides:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common
representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-
client privileges, and obtains each client's consent to the common representation;(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible
with the client's best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed
decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interest of
any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken
impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of
the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/8
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suit with each client concerning the implications of the common repre-
sentation. She must explain the advantages and risks of common
representation and obtain each client's consent. The lawyer also must
"reasonably believe" that intermediation does not pose a disadvantage to
the clients' interests and that she, as an intermediary, can act impartially.
The Rule implicitly and explicitly refers to the lawyer-intermediary as
the representative of both parties.2 5  The commentary expressly states
that Rule 2.2 does not apply if the parties are not "clients," even if the
parties have appointed the lawyer as a non-representational mediator.26
Therefore, if the divorce mediator does not take a common-representa-
tion approach to the mediation sessions, Model Rule 2.2 offers no gui-
dance and may implicitly forbid the lawyer to act in a non-
representational capacity.27 Ethics committees and commentators have
found the common-representation approach difficult, and sometimes im-
possible, to apply in the divorce mediation context.28 Several bar associa-
decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each client
can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so request, or if any of
the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer
shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the
intermediation.
25. A "lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule [2.2] when the lawyer represents two or
more parties with potentially conflicting interests." MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 comment
(emphasis added).
26. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 comment. Rule 2.2 distinguishes mediation between
clients from mediation between non-clients. Rule 2.2 does not apply to the latter. It is unclear,
however, when a lawyer represents participants in mediation such that they become clients. Folberg
and Taylor note that "a lawyer who serves as a mediator outside of the law office, gives no legal
advice or opinions, and does not draw up an agreement is not acting in a legal capacity and is not
then governed by the lawyer's code." FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note I, at 254-55. These com-
mentators note that such instances are rare and more often a lawyer offers impartial legal advice or
explains the law to the participants. Id.
27. The history of Rule 2.2 indicates that the rule may not apply to divorce mediation even if
the lawyer-mediator adopts a common representation approach. In early drafts of Model Rule 2.2,
the commentary stated that "under some circumstances a lawyer may act as an intermediary be-
tween spouses in arranging the terms of an uncontested separation or divorce settlement." MODEL
RULES, supra note 3, Rule 5.1 comment (Discussion Draft 1980). The drafters deleted this language
in the final version, possibly indicating an intent that Rule 2.2 not apply to divorce mediation. Pro-
fessor Silberman notes that in light of the conflicting state ethics opinions on the subject of divorce
mediation, the framers of the Model Rules should have made express reference to the issue. Silber-
man, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q. 107, 121 (1982).
28. See infra notes 29-45 and accompanying text. Professor Silberman notes that the difference
between common representation and non-representation may be largely semantic. Alternatively, the
distinction "may signify important assumptions about the role of the lawyer in mediation and about
the tasks and responsibilities that may be undertaken." Silberman, supra note 27, at 121.
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tion ethics opinions have suggested a non-representational approach to
divorce mediation as the proper method to resolve potential ethical
dilemmas.
III. ETHICS OPINIONS UNDER THE MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Boston Bar Association Opinion No. 78-1
The Boston Committee on Ethics, in Opinion No. 78-1, reviewed a
lawyer's proposal to mediate and draft a separation agreement for a di-
vorcing couple.29 The committee found the conflicts inherent in the di-
vorce context too great to permit the lawyer to represent both parties.
The committee resolved the conflict-of-interest problem by allowing the
lawyer to mediate if she does not represent either party.30
The committee recognized several possible difficulties of the non-repre-
sentational approach in divorce mediation.31 The committee expressed
concern that a party would claim that the lawyer-mediator had not fully
explained all applicable considerations and as a result was led to agree to
a settlement that he would not otherwise have accepted. Second, the
committee noted that economic and personality differences between the
parties might result in unequal bargaining power. Finally, the committee
feared that without the assistance of independent counsel the parties
might make commitments they would subsequently regret and renegoti-
ation would be difficult, time consuming and expensive.
The committee also suggested that difficulties might arise if the parties
sought other legal representation after reaching a mediated settlement.
The committee felt that an attorney Who had not participated in the ne-
gotiations would find it difficult to evaluate whether the agreement accu-
rately reflected the views, needs, strengths and weaknesses of the parties.
As a result, lawyers might decline to advise the parties, undertake a full
scale review leading to a reopening of the negotiations, or focus on the
form rather than the substance of the agreement.3 2
Acknowledging that problems inhere in any approach to divorce, the
committee permitted non-representational divorce mediation despite the
29. Boston Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. 78-1 (1978).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. See also Samuels & Shawn, The Role of the Lawyer Outside the Mediation Process, I
MEDIATION Q. 13 (1984) (discussing the role of an independent counsel for clients who are engaged
in mediation).
[Vol. 65:223
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potential difficulties. The committee recognized that divorce mediation
would be beneficial in many instances, because it allows the parties to
settle their dispute cheaply and avoids some emotional distress.33 The
committee emphasized the lawyer-mediator's obligation to explain that
she does not represent either party as well as the benefits and disadvan-
tages of mediation. Under these circumstances, the committee asserted
that the parties should be free to choose non-representational divorce me-
diation to resolve their dispute.
B. Connecticut Bar Association Formal Opinion 35
The Ethics Committee of the Connecticut Bar Association reviewed a
mediation model in which an interdisciplinary team, including a mental
health professional, a lawyer and an accountant, would offer divorce me-
diation.34 Under the proposed model, the lawyer would not represent
either party. The committee encouraged mediation as a means to reduce
the acrimony generated in adversarial divorce proceedings. 35 The com-
mittee found that the differing interests of the parties did not prevent an
attorney from serving as a facilitator on behalf of both parties in an at-
tempt to reach an agreement.
C. New York City Bar Association Opinion No. 80-23
The New York City Bar Association Committee on Professional and
Judicial Ethics issued Opinion No. 80-23 regarding a lawyer's participa-
tion in a non-profit interdisciplinary divorce mediation program.36 The
opinion allowed the lawyer-mediator to participate if she followed spe-
cific "rules. ' 37 One of the rules requires the lawyer-mediator to clearly
33. Boston Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. 78-1 (1978). The committee noted that pro se proceedings
offered the least expensive alternative, but that ignorance of the law may cause the parties to agree to
inappropriate arrangements. The committee found that this problem would not exist if separate
counsel represented each client, but noted the additional financial and emotional cost resulting from
separate representation. Id.
34. Conn. Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. 35 (1982).
35. Id. The committee noted that lawyers had acted as mediators in other volatile areas such as
labor law. Id.
36. N.Y. City Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. 80-23 (1981).
37. Id. The opinion provided that: (1) the lawyer must clearly and fully advise the parties of
the limitations resulting from the lawyer's non-representational role and warn the parties that they
should not look to the lawyer to protect their individual interests or keep confidences from the other
party; (2) the lawyer must clearly and fully explain the risks of proceeding without separate counsel
and proceed only with the understanding and consent of the parties; (3) a lawyer may participate
with mental health professionals only in those aspects of mediation which do not require the exercise
1987]
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explain the risks and significance of the lawyer-mediator's role as a repre-
sentative of neither party. The parties then must expressly consent
before the lawyer-mediator may proceed. The committee cautioned that
mediation may be inappropriate in some circumstances, either because
informed consent is impossible to achieve or the issues are too compli-
cated to be resolved without the aid of separate counsel. 38 The commit-
tee noted that situations clearly exist where the parties prudently can
consent to mediation and the use of an impartial, non-representational
advisor.39
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF COMMON REPRESENTATION
Several commentators have suggested that both the adversarial and the
common representation models fail to adequately describe the divorce
mediation process. Richard Crouch, Chairman of the Ethical Practices
and Procedures Committee, Family Law Section, of the American Bar
Association, explains that the lawyer-mediator, unlike the lawyer in an
adversarial proceeding, does not represent the interests of one party
against the other.4' Crouch suggests that mediation is most successful
when the lawyer represents neither party and the parties give informed
consent to non-representation at the outset of the process. 41
According to Leonard Riskin, Director of the Center for the Study of
Dispute Resolution at the University of Missouri-Columbia, there is a
"traditional" and a "progressive" approach to the lawyer-mediator's rep-
of professional legal judgment-the same kind of mediation activities permissible to lay mediators;
(4) a lawyer may provide impartial legal advice and assist in reducing the parties' agreement to
writing only if the lawyer fully explains all pertinent considerations, alternatives and consequences to
each party; (5) the lawyer may give legal advice only to both parties in the presence of the other;
(6) the lawyer must advise the parties of the advantages of seeking independent counsel before exe-
cuting any agreement the lawyer drafts. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. See also Mass. Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. 85-3 (1985). The Massachusetts Bar Association
suggests that the mediation process consists of two steps, each with a different representational role.
First, when actually mediating, the lawyer does not represent either party. In the second step-
drafting a separation agreement-the lawyer performs a dual-representational role. Because the law-
yer makes choices in language that may result in a more advantageous result for one party, the
committee believes that the lawyer's role in drafting a separation agreement is more properly charac-
terized as representational. Id. The opinion requires a lawyer to discuss the two different roles at
the outset of the mediation process. Id.
40. R. Crouch, The Dark Side of Mediation: Still Unexplored, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 345 (ABA 1982).
41. Id. at 346.
[Vol. 65:223
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/8
ETHICS AND DIVORCE MEDIATION
resentational role.42 The traditional approach, adopted in Model Rule
2.2, views the lawyer-mediator as an advocate for both clients. Riskin
believes that this approach makes lawyer-mediation less effective because
representation burdens the lawyer with conflict of interest concerns.4"
The progressive approach, which views the lawyer-mediator as a neutral
intermediary rather than a representative of the parties, relieves the law-
yer-mediator of the obligations imposed by traditional representation and
the attorney-client privilege.' This approach removes conflict-of-inter-
est concerns. Riskin argues that the progressive, non-representational
approach enhances the effectiveness of the lawyer-mediator because it
emphasizes her role as a neutral third party.45
V. CLOSING THE ETHICS GAP
Commentators and bar association ethics committees have found
Model Rule 2.2's common-representation approach an inadequate model
for the role of lawyer-mediators in the divorce setting.46 The Rule cre-
ates an "ethics gap" by its express terms, because it fails to recognize the
alternative of non-representational divorce mediation.4' Without a dis-
cernable ethical standard to guide their conduct, lawyers will be reluc-
tant to undertake divorce mediation for fear of malpractice liability and
disciplinary action. For this reason, one of several possible solutions
should be employed to close the ethics gap.
A. A Separate Code of Ethics
One possibility would be to designate lawyer-mediators as a separate
professional group subject to their own rules of ethical conduct. The
American Bar Association would lack authority to regulate the activities
of lawyer-mediators engaged in divorce mediation. Such an approach,
however, ignores the fact that bar associations have already taken juris-
diction over lawyers practicing divorce mediation. In addition continued
supervision by bar associations would seem to be desirable because law-
yer-mediators also employ traditional legal skills in the resolution of
42. Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 329
(1984).
43. Id. at 342.
44. Id. at 342-43.
45. Id.
46. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
19871
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these disputes.48 As a result lawyer-mediators would be subject to con-
current and potentially conflicting ethical standards. Forcing lawyer-
mediators to limit their activities to those permissible for lay-mediators
would avoid the concurrent jurisdiction problem but also would destroy
an important advantage of lawyer-mediation-the application of legal
skills and knowledge to the settlement process. 49 For these reasons,
treating lawyer-mediators as a separate professional group will not solve
the problems created by Rule 2.2.
B. Amending Model Rule 2.2
Another way to address the ethical concerns of lawyers who perform
nonrepresentational divorce mediation would be to amend Rule 2.2.
Adding the words "mediator," "lawyer-mediator," "non-representa-
tion," and "parties" in the appropriate places would expand the scope of
Rule 2.2 to encompass non-representational mediation.5" Unless such an
amendment referred specifically to divorce mediation, however, the Rule
would apply to all mediation, with less than desirable results. In any
event, such an amendment would create a clumsy and cumbersome rule.
It merely adds the non-representational role to a rule designed to reflect a
common representational approach.51
C. A New Model Rule
A new rule offering guidance to lawyers engaged in non-representa-
tional divorce mediation would provide the most effective solution to the
ethics gap in Rule 2.2. The rule should address the unique issues that
arise in the non-representation context. To ensure that the lawyer-medi-
48. Without such concurrent regulation, lawyer-mediators who drafted separation agreements
might be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 5.5
(unauthorized practice of law).
49. Professor Riskin notes that learning in law school has widened to encompass "political,
economic, social and emotional factors that do or should impact on decisions and the effects of
decisions on individuals and society." Riskin, supra note 11, at 55. In addition, because the lawyer
is a legal expert, "the lawyer-mediator can help the parties free themselves, when appropriate, from
the influence of legal norms so that they can reach for a solution that is appropriate to them." Id. at
40-41.
50. An amended Model Rule 2.2(a)(1), for example, could read:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary/mediator between clients/parties if:
(1) The lawyer consults with each client/party concerning the implications of common
representation/non-representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the
effect on the attorney-client privilege, and obtains each client's/party's consent to the com-
mon representation/non-representation.
51. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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ator remains a neutral third party, for example, the rule must require her
to serve in an impartial and unbiased manner. Because of the limited
scope of the non-representational role, the rule must require the lawyer-
mediator to inform the parties of the difference between the guidance a
lawyer-mediator provides and the advice a traditional adversarial lawyer
provides. 52
The proposed rule, however, need not address those concerns unique
to a common-representation approach. Unlike the role of a Rule 2.2 in-
termediary,53 for example, the non-representational role of a divorce me-
diator is completely non-adversarial. As a result, the attorney-client
privilege does not attach. In addition, because the lawyer-mediator in
the non-representational role represents neither party, not both, the rule
need not address conflict-of-interest concerns.54 The following proposed
rule offers the necessary guidance:
(1) A lawyer may perform divorce mediation if:
(a) the lawyer informs each party that the lawyer does not represent
that party or any party to the process, but instead acts as a neutral
facilitator; and
(b) the lawyer fully explains to each party the duties a non-mediating
lawyer owes to a client and the privileges afforded the lawyer-client rela-
tionship, and fully informs each client of the duties and privileges applica-
ble to the relationship between the lawyer and the parties to the mediation;
and
(c) the lawyer explains to each party the role the lawyer will perform in
drafting any agreement; and
(d) the lawyer explains to each party the consequences of the lawyer's
non-representation should the mediation terminate; and
(e) the lawyer obtains consent from each party to act in a non-represen-
tational role.
(2) If the lawyer and the parties to the divorce mediation choose to have
the lawyer represent all parties in a common representational role, the
guidelines of Rule 2.2 shall apply.
52. Ethics opinions concerning non-representational divorce mediation generally define the
lawyer's role as that of a neutral facilitator. Because the public may not know the difference between
a lawyer-mediator's duties and a traditional lawyer's duties, the ethics opinions require the lawyer to
clarify the distinctions. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
1987]
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VI. CONCLUSION
The increased interest in divorce mediation has created a need for a
new Model Rule to provide ethical guidance to lawyer-mediators. Be-
cause Model Rule 2.2 applies only to "common representation," the rule
offers no guidance to lawyers providing non-representational divorce me-
diation. As a result, the Model Rules contain an "ethics gap." This
Note proposes filling this gap with a new Model Rule that specifically
addresses the unique ethical considerations arising from the non-
representational role lawyers may assume in divorce mediation.
Wendy Woods
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